

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
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R 151221Z JAN 76

FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6820

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 BANGKOK 0933

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: SNAR, TH

SUBJECT: U.S. NARCOTICS ASSISTANCE TO THAILAND

REF: STATE 304901

1. WE WELCOME REFTEL AND THE OPPORTUNITY FOR A CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE WITH THE DEPARTMENT ABOUT THE BEST WAY TO HANDLE THE PROBLEMS WE FACE IN OUR NARCOTICS ENFORCEMENT PROGRAMS IN THAILAND. LIKE THE DEPARTMENT, WE ARE CONCERNED BY THE SERIOUS SHORTCOMINGS ON THE PART OF THE ROYAL THAI GOVERNMENT. IN APPROACHING THE QUESTION OF HOW TO STIMULATE IMPROVED THAI PERFORMANCE THERE ARE SEVERAL KEY CONSIDERATIONS. IN OUR VIEW, THESE SHOULD FIRST BE PROPERLY ASSESSED, AFTER WHICH A PATTERN OF ORCHESTRATED ACTION SHOULD BE LAUNCHED NOT ONLY IN BANGKOK BUT IN GENEVA AND ELSEWHERE WHICH MAY PRODUCE RESULTS.

2. SITUATION

WE BELIEVE THERE ARE SEVERAL BASIC FACTORS WHICH MUST BE KEPT IN MIND IN DETERMINING THE BEST WAY TO ACHIEVE OUR OBJECTIVES:

A. FIRST, THERE IS JUST SO MUCH THAT THE UNITED STATES CAN DO, WHETHER THAT ACTION BE UNDERTAKEN BY DEA, USDA, U.S. CUSTOMS OR ANY OTHER AGENCY. OUR BASIC CONCERN HAS TO BE (AS IT HAS BEEN IN THE PAST) TO ENERGIZE THAI

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INDIVIDUALS AND ORGANIZATIONS, GOVERNMENTAL AND PRIVATE--

OVER TIME. THERE IS NO QUICK FIX WHICH WILL MAKE THE THAI BEHAVE LIKE DYNAMIC AMERICANS.

B. THE HISTORY OF OUR INTIMATE RELATIONS WITH THAILAND OVER THE LAST 25 YEARS SHOWS THAT THREATS AND PUNITIVE ACTIONS DO NOT RESULT IN IMPROVED PERFORMANCE AND OFTEN PRODUCE MORE NON-PERFORMANCE, RECALCITRANCE AND IN SOME CASES RETALIATION.

C. THOUGH THE THAI INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION HAS CHANGED DRAMATICALLY DURING THE PAST FEW DAYS, THE BASIC FACT REMAINS THAT THE FORMER KHUKRIT GOVERNMENT, THE CURRENT CARETAKER CABINET AND ALMOST CERTAINLY ANY FUTURE GOVERNMENT IN THAILAND, PRESIDES OVER A COLLEGIAL POWER STRUCTURE. THE LIMITATIONS ON KHUKRIT'S AUTHORITY HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED IN A NUMBER OF OUR REPORTS AND WERE NEVER MORE IN EVIDENCE THAN DURING THE LAST TWO WEEKS. KHUKRIT IS IMPORTANT, BUT LIMITING OURSELVES TO BEATING HIM ABOUT THE HEAD AND SHOULDERS WILL NOT ACHIEVE OUR OBJECTIVES.

D. CORRUPTION IS A WAY OF LIFE IN THAILAND, AS IN A NUMBER OF OTHER COUNTRIES. OUR ABILITY TO INFLUENCE THE THAI TO CHANGE SUCH BASIC SOCIAL PATTERNS AND PRACTICES IS EXTREMELY LIMITED AND WE SHOULD NOT DELUDE OURSELVES INTO THINKING THAT STRONG EXHORTATIONS OR THREATS BY US, HOWEVER VALID, WILL PRODUCE CHANGE. WE WILL, HOWEVER, CONTINUE TO ATTEMPT TO ISOLATE NARCOTICS ENFORCEMENT FROM THIS CORRUPTION.

E. WE MUST ALSO CONSIDER THE LIKELY DEGREE OF IMPROVEMENT IN REDUCING TRAFFIC WHICH WOULD RESULT FROM A MORE EFFECTIVE THAI EFFORT. AT THE PRESENT TIME WE ARE INTERDICTING ABOUT FIVE OR SIX TONS OF OPIUM EQUIVALENT PER ANNUM AND ARE SERIOUSLY HARASSING INTERNATIONAL TRAFFICKERS LARGELY AS A RESULT OF A LARGE COMMITMENT OF U.S. PERSONNEL TO NARCOTICS ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION. WE CANNOT AVOID THE UNHAPPY FACT THAT VERY LARGE AMOUNTS OF NARCOTICS ARE MOVING OUT OF THIS AREA AND THAT EVEN A QUANTUM JUMP IN THAI SEIZURES WOULD STILL LEAVE VERY LARGE AMOUNTS ENTERING THE INTERNATIONAL MARKET. THIS DOES NOT EXCUSE POOR THAI PERFORMANCE BUT EVEN DOUBLING OR TRIPLING SEIZURES HERE WILL HAVE LITTLE EFFECT

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ON THE OVERALL PATTERN. HOWEVER, ARREST AND IMMOBILIZATION OF MAJOR SYNDICATE HEADS BY THE THAI WOULD RAISE THE LEVEL OF EFFECTIVENESS.

F. THAILAND IS NOW ENGAGED IN WHAT IS PROBABLY ITS MOST SERIOUS FIGHT FOR SURVIVAL. ELECTIONS, INTERNAL POLITICAL PRESSURES, SECURITY AGAINST INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL ATTACK, AND SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PRESSURES ARE GIVEN TOP PRIORITY

BY THIS AND ALMOST CERTAINLY ANY FUTURE GOVERNMENT. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES AN IMPLIED THREAT BY THE U.S. TO CUT OFF OUR AID WOULD BE READ BY THE THAI AS A CLEAR SIGNAL THAT WE CARE NOTHING ABOUT THEIR SURVIVAL IN THE WAKE OF THE COLLAPSE OF CAMBODIA, SOUTH VIETNAM AND LAOS.

G. THE THAI PERCEPTION OF THE NARCOTICS SITUATION IS THAT THEY ARE COOPERATING WITH US IN MUCH THE SAME WAY THAT THEY HAVE IN THE PAST. GIVEN THIS OUTLOOK AND THEIR UNDERSTANDABLE PREOCCUPATION WITH MATTERS WHICH BEAR ON THEIR NATIONAL SURVIVAL, WE ARE FACED WITH A LONG-TERM PROBLEM AND NOT ONE WHICH CAN BE RESOLVED BY ANY QUICK DEMARCHE.

H. THE REFTEL GIVES THE IMPRESSION THAT NO PROGRESS HAS BEEN ACHIEVED. MUCH REMAINS TO BE DONE, BUT WE HAVE COME A LONG WAY FROM THE PLACIDITY WITH WHICH THE THAI VIEWED THE PROBLEM FOUR YEARS AGO. WE ARE CONVINCED THERE HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANT CHANGES FOR THE BETTER IN THE PERCEPTION BY THE THAI OF THEIR PROBLEM. SOME ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES HAVE ALSO OCCURRED. WE NEED CONSTRUCTIVELY TO BUILD ON THIS BASE.

3. THAI PERFORMANCE

REGARDING SPECIFICS, SOME STATEMENT IN THE REFTEL ARE MORE SWEEPING THAN THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO US WOULD SUPPORT. HOWEVER, RATHER THAN ATTEMPT POINT-BY-POINT REBUTTAL OF WHAT IS IN ITS BROAD ASPECTS A GENERALLY ACCURATE PORTRAYAL OF THE CURRENT THAI SITUATION, WE HAVE APPROACHED THIS MATTER CONSTRUCTIVELY, AS WE ASSUME THE DEPARTMENT HAS DONE. OUR OBJECTIVE IS TO WORK WITH THE DEPARTMENT AND OTHER WASHINGTON AGENCIES TO FIND THE BEST WAY TO SERVE U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS IN MEETING OUR NARCOTICS AS WELL AS OTHER OBJECTIVES IN THAILAND. AT THE SAME TIME, IN ORDER THAT WE AND

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WASHINGTON APPROACH THE PROBLEM ON THE BASIS OF THE SAME DATE, WE BELIEVE SEVERAL POINTS COVERED IN THE REFTEL REQUIRE FURTHER ELABORATION.

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 BANGKOK 0933

EXDIS

A. THAI SUPPORT FOR BURMESE DISSIDENTS

THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT THE THAI GOVERNMENT TOLERATES THE PRESENCE OF BURMESE DISSIDENTS ON THAI SOIL, ALTHOUGH THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SOME OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT WOULD LIKE TO END THIS PRESENCE. THE EXTENT OF DIRECT THAI SUPPORT FOR THE DISSIDENTS IS, HOWEVER, LESS CLEAR. ALSO UNCERTAIN IS WHETHER THE THAI HAVE THE ABILITY, MUCH LESS THE WILL, TO DRIVE THESE ELEMENTS FROM THAILAND. OUR JUDGMENT IS THAT, FACED WITH SERIOUS THREATS ON THEIR OTHER BORDERS, THEY WILL NOT TAKE ACTION AGAINST THESE GROUPS IN THE NORTH. WHATEVER THE MERITS MAY BE, THE THAI BELIEVE THESE ELEMENTS PROVIDE THE AJOR DEFENSE FOR THE NORTHERN FRONTIER AGAINST COMMUNIST ELEMENTS IN BURMA. WE LACK THE LEVERAGE TO FORCE THE THAI TO CHANGE THIS ASSESSMENT.

B. ENFORCEMENT OF THE POPPY BAN

IT IS TRUE THAT THE THAI HAVE NOT ENFORCED THE 1959 BAN ON OPIUM CULTIVATION. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THE RTG WILL DO SO UNLESS AND UNTIL AWTERNATIVE MEANS OF LIVELIHOOD ARE AVAILABLE FOR THE HILLTRIBES. THE DEPARTMENT WILL RECALL THAT IN 1972 AND 1973, AT A TIME WHEN U.S. ENFORCEMENT PROGRAMS RAN AHEAD OF PROGRAMS DESIGNED TO HELP THE HILLTRIBES, THE KING AND OTHER KEY THAI OFFICIALS SAID CLEARLY THAT ENFORCEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS MUST PROCEED APACE. WE BELIEVE THIS IS NO LESS TRUE TODAY. GIVEN THEIR OTHER SECURITY PROBLEMS, THE THAI WILL NOT RPT NOT BE WILLING TO TAKE ACTIONS WHICH WOULD ALIENATE THE
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HILLTRIBES. THIS SITUATION BEARS ON WASHINGTON'S DESIRE TO TERMINATE OUR SUPPORT FOR CCING-FUNDED CROP SUBSTITUTION AND OTHER DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS IN THE NORTH, A MOVE WHICH WE BELIEVE WOULD BE PARTICULARLY UNTIMELY SINCE THERE IS DEVELOPING RTG INTEREST AND ACTION TO EXPAND THE UNPDAC ACTIVITY TO A LARGER NUMBER OF OPIUM GROWING VILLAGES.

C. DRUG ADDICTION IN THAILAND

WE ARE BY NO MEANS CERTAIN JUST WHAT THE EXACT LEVEL OF DRUG ADDICTION IS IN THAILAND. PREVAILING FIGURES (THOSE CITED IN REFTEL WHICH WE AND OTHERS HAVE REPORTED IN THE ABSENCE OF REALLY RELIABLE DATA) MAY WELL BE SIGNIFICANTLY INFLATED. IN ACTUAL FACT, WE OURSELVES HAVE PLANTED SOME OF THESE FIGURES TO STIMULATE THAI CONCERN WITH THE PROBLEM. NONETHELESS, THAILAND DOES HAVE A SERIOUS PROBLEM OF ADDICTION. THE QUESTION IS WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT. WE HAVE FOUND IN OTHER AREAS OF COOPERATION WITH THE ROYAL THAI GOVERNMENT--COUNTERINSURGENCY, FOR EXAMPLE-- THAT WE ARE UNABLE TO MOVE THE THAI IN DOMESTIC MATTERS ON WHICH WE ARE MORE CONCERNED THAN THEY. WE HAVE ATTEMPTED TO CONVINCE THE THAI THAT THEY THEMSELVES HAVE A SERIOUS PROBLEM. SOME AGREE, AND THERE IS FURTHER EVIDENCE OF GROWING CONCERN FOR THE THAI DRUG PROBLEM, ESPECIALLY AMONG CIVIC LEADERS AND GROUPS. THEY ARE BEGINNING TO MAKE THEMSELVES HEARD AND EVENTUALLY WILL FORCE THE RTG TO TAKE MORE EFFECTIVE STEPS TO CURB THE DRUG PROBLEM IF WE WORK WITH THEM CONSTRUCTIVELY.

D. THAI BUDGET FOR ENFORCEMENT

WE FULLY AGREE THAT THE THAI SHOULD DEVOTE ADDITIONAL RESOURCES TO NARCOTICS ENFORCEMENT BUT WE CANNOT REALISTICALLY EXPECT THEM TO PUT THIS AT THE TOP OF THEIR PRIORITY LIST WHEN THEY ARE FIGHTING FOR NATIONAL SURVIVAL. IN ANY EVENT, THE FIGURES CITED IN PARAGRAPH 6 REFTEL ARE SOMEWHAT MISLEADING. THE FIGURE OF \$225,000 IS THE LEVEL OF THE RTG SUPPORT FOR THE CENTRAL NARCOTICS BUREAU; THIS APPARENTLY HAS NOT INCREASED SINCE 1970 (NO ELEMENT OF THE MISSION HERE KNOWS THE ORIGIN OF THE 1964 BASE DATE USED IN REFTEL). THERE ARE NO OTHER DIRECT LINE ITEMS IN THE BUDGET FOR NARCOTICS, BUT IN 1974 (BANGKOK 6764 OF APRIL 25) WE ESTIMATED THAT THE TNPD SPENT ABOUT \$4.5 MILLION ON NARCOTICS ENFORCEMENT. ADDITIONAL
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AMOUNTS WERE SPENT ON ENFORCEMENT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF CUSTOMS AND BY OTHER RTG AGENCIES FOR NARCOTICS TREATMENT AND CROP SUBSTITUTION, CONSERVATIVELY ESTIMATED AT ANOTHER \$4.5 MILLION.

E. JUSTIFICATION FOR ADDITIONAL HELICOPTERS

ONE OBJECTIVE IN PROVIDING ADDITIONAL HELICOPTERS TO THE TNPD WAS TO GIVE THEM THE CAPABILITY TO MOVE A BPP PLATOON OF ABOUT 50 MEN INTO ACTION AT ONE TIME. THIS IS BY NO MEANS THE WHOLE RATIONALE, HOWEVER. A NUMBER OF OTHER OBJECTIVES WERE OUTLINED IN THE PROAG SIGNED ON MAY 20, 1974. IT IS IN PART BECAUSE OF THE DIRECT THREAT TO THE TRAFFICKERS POSED BY THE TNPD THROUGH INCREASED SURVEILLANCE AND GREATER ACTIVITY THAT

THE TRAFFICKERS HAVE HAD TO MOVE TO MORE DIFFICULT MEANS FOR TRANSPORT. OUR JOB NOW IS TO MAKE IT EVEN MORE DIFFICULT, AND IN OUR VIEW THIS WOULD BE THE WRONG TIME TO PULL BACK FROM A PROGRAM THAT IS PROVIDING "FIRST GENERATION" RESULTS.

4. COURSES OF ACTION

THE REFTEL INSTRUCTS US TO TAKE THREE STEPS: THE AMBASSADOR IS TO SEE THE PRIME MINISTER IN AN EFFORT TO IMPRESS ON HIM THE NEED FOR A STRONG NATIONAL THAI COMMITMENT AGAINST NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING AND POINT TO THE POSSIBLE TERMINATION OF U.S. AID; USOM IS TO FORMALLY NOTIFY THE TNPD (THIS WOULD HAVE TO BE TO DTEC AS SIGNER OF THE PROAG) THAT WE WILL NOT DELIVER THE FIVE ADDITIONAL HELICOPTERS PROVIDED UNDER THE MAY 1974 PROAG; AND WE ARE TO INFORM THE RTG THAT ACTION ON CCINC-FUNDED CROP SUBSTITUTION PROJECTS WOULD BE DEFERRED.

EVEN IF WE HAD AN EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT WITH WHICH TO DEAL (AND WE DO NOT) WE BELIEVE THERE IS NO WAY WE COULD PRESENT THESE PUNITIVE ACTIONS TO THE THAI IN A WAY WHICH WOULD "MINIMIZE ADVERSE IMPACT ON U.S.-THAI RELATIONS" (PARA 12 REFTEL). THESE RELATIONS CANNOT BE COMPARTMENTALIZED. WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THREATENING THE THAI--AND HOWEVER WE PRESENT THEM, THESE STEPS WOULD BE VIEWED AS A SERIOUS THREAT--WOULD PUT THE RTG IN A POSITION IN WHICH IT WOULD SEE NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO TAKE COUNTER MEASURES TO SAVE FACE. ALL THE SENSITIVITIES INVOLVED IN A BIG POWER-SMALL ALLY RELATIONSHIP WOULD BE TRIGGERED, AS THEY WERE DURING THE MAYAGUEZ AFFAIR. OTHER ASPECTS OF OUR
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BILATERAL RELATIONS WOULD BE AFFECTED IN MAJOR WAYS AND DEA EFFECTIVENESS HERE WOULD BE SERIOUSLY ENDANGERED.

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S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 BANGKOK 0933

EXDIS

5. SUGGESTIONS

WE HAVE CAREFULLY NOTED IN STATE 000050 THE THREE CRITERIA CITED BY THE SECRETARY WHICH MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN DETERMINING OUR NARCOTICS CONTROL PROGRAM IN EACH COUNTRY. CONSISTENT WITH THESE CRITERIA, WE BELIEVE OUR MOST PROMISING COURSE IN THAILAND WOULD BE A CAREFULLY ORCHESTRATED PROGRAM INVOLVING THE FOLLOWING CONSTRUCTIVE STEPS:

A. WE WOULD THROUGH VARIOUS KEY SOURCES, BOTH CIVILIAN AND MILITARY, SEND SIGNALS TO THE TOP THAI LEADERSHIP THAT INCREASING AMOUNTS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA HEROIN ARE ENTERING THE UNITED STATES, THAT WE ARE GRAVELY CONCERNED OVER THIS SITUATION AND THAT, WHILE PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE, WE BELIEVE THAILAND CAN AND SHOULD DO MUCH MORE. WE WILL ALLUDE TO PERTINENT LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS BUT BELIEVE THAT IN THE ORIENT IMPLIED THREATS OF THIS KIND ARE BEST HANDLED OBLIQUELY.

B. AFTER OUR RENEWED CONCERN HAS AGAIN BEEN BROUGHT INDIRECTLY TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S ATTENTION THROUGH THAI SOURCES, AND WHEN THE POLITICAL SITUATION INDICATES THAT AN APPROACH WOULD BE PRODUCTIVE, THE AMBASSADOR WOULD SEE THE PRIME MINISTER TO IMPRESS ON HIM ONCE AGAIN THE IMPORTANCE THE THAI SHOULD ATTACH TO NARCOTICS ENFORCEMENT. HE WOULD ALSO DISCUSS SHORTCOMINGS IN THAI PERFORMANCE. (THIS IS A NECESSARY STEP BUT NOT ONE WHICH WILL PAY LARGE DIVIDENDS GIVEN KHUKRIT'S CURRENT CARETAKER STATUS AND THE INHERENT LIMITS ON HIS AUTHORITY.)

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C. WE WOULD ORGANIZE A JOINT USG-THAI EVALUATION OF THE NARCOTICS ENFORCEMENT PROJECT SIMILAR TO OTHER JOINT EVALUATIONS USOM HAS UNDERTAKEN WITH VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF THE THAI GOVERNMENT. WE PROPOSE TO FOCUS INITIALLY ON THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEM OF HELICOPTERS, LINKING STATED GOALS AND OBJECTIVES WITH ACTUAL PERFORMANCE AND PLANS. WE WOULD HOPE THAT THE FINAL DECISION REGARDING DELIVERY OF THE FIVE HELICOPTERS CAN BE DELAYED UNTIL AFTER THE EVALUATION IS COMPLETED. WE HAVE FOUND SUCH JOINT EVALUATIONS USEFUL IN PINPOINTING PROBLEMS AND PROMPTING CORRECTIVE ACTION. WE CAN THEN FOLLOW UP CLOSELY AGAINST A THAI COMMITMENT TO SPECIFICS. WE BELIEVE THIS JOINT EVALUATION WOULD BE USEFUL IN DRIVING HOME TO KEY THAI OFFICIALS

THE FACT THAT THEIR HELICOPTERS ARE UNDER UTILIZED AND THAT IT WOULD NOT BE USEFUL FOR US TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL HELICOPTERS UNLESS AND UNTIL PLANS ARE DEVELOPED FOR THEIR EFFECTIVE UTILIZATION. WE STRONGLY URGE THAT A SENIOR OFFICER FROM THE DEPARTMENT PARTICIPATE IN THIS EVALUATION, WHICH WE ESTIMATE WOULD TAKE ABOUT TWO WEEKS.

D. DEA HAS ALREADY LAUNCHED A REVIEW OF SNO'S OPERATIONS. GIVEN SNO'S POOR PERFORMANCE DURING THE PAST YEAR, LARGELY DUE TO RECENTLY SURFACED CORRUPTION, WE PROPOSE TO PRESS AHEAD WITH THIS WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF REDUCING SNO TO A MAXIMUM OF THREE GARRISONS IN THE NORTH. DEA IS CURRENTLY WORKING WITH THE THAI TO RESTRUCTURE AND RESTAFF SNO. EVEN THESE THREE STATIONS, IF IT IS DEEMED DESIRABLE TO KEEP THEM, WILL BE KEPT UNDER CLOSE SCRUTINY TO SEE WHETHER THEY JUSTIFY THE EXPENDITURE OF FUNDS BY DEA.

E. USDA SUPPORTED RESEARCH PROJECTS WOULD BE CONTINUED AND LIMITED U.S. SUPPORT FOR CROP SUBSTITUTION PROGRAMS WOULD BE REQUESTED AND CARRIED FORWARD WHERE THESE SUPPORT RTG EFFORTS TO EXTEND THE UNPDAC PILOT PROJECT AND, MORE IMPORTANTLY, ONLY UNDER THE FIRM UNDERSTANDING THAT ENFORCEMENT WOULD FOLLOW CROP SUBSTITUTION WITHIN A PERIOD OF ABOUT TWO YEARS. SIMILAR CRITERIA SHOULD BE ADOPTED BY THE UNPDAC FOR ITS PROGRAMS IN THAILAND AND DECISIONS/ACTION IN GENEVA NEXT MONTH SHOULD BE COORDINATED AND SUPPORTIVE OF OUR POSITION.

F. OUR EMBASSIES IN WESTERN EUROPEAN NATIONS WITH DRUG PROBLEMS AND IN CANADA SHOULD BE INSTRUCTED TO MAKE HIGH LEVEL APPROACHES
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TO HOST GOVERNMENTS TO UNDERScore OUR CONCERN ABOUT THE CONTINUED FLOW OF NARCOTICS THROUGH THAILAND TO WORLD MARKETS AND TO INDUCE THOSE GOVERNMENT TO BRING PRESSURE ON THE RTG. WE BELIEVE EARLIER APPROACHES, BASED ON OUR RECOMMENDATIONS, HAVE FAILED BECAUSE THEY WERE DONE IN MANY CASES AT TOO LOW A LEVEL. IF THE REFTEL IS A REFLECTION OF THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO THIS PROBLEM, THEN OUR AMBASSADORS IN OTHER AFFECTED CAPITALS SHOULD BECOME DIRECTLY INVOLVED.

6. THE AMBASSADOR LOOKS FORWARD TO DISCUSSING THIS MATTER WITH ASSISTANT SECRETARY HABIB DURING THE CHIEFS OF MISSION CONFERNECE IN HONOLULU LATER THIS MONTH.
WHITEHOUSE

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